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THE PRICE OF CONFLICT: WAR, TAXES, AND 
THE POLITICS OF FISCAL CITIZENSHIP† 
Ajay K. Mehrotra* 
War and Taxes. By Steven A. Bank, Kirk J. Stark, and Joseph J. Thorndike. 
Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press. 2008. Pp. xix, 224. $26.50. 
Introduction 
In the spring of 2003, Congress was in the midst of drafting a new tax 
bill. Two years earlier, the Bush Administration and congressional leaders 
had initiated a tax-cutting agenda by slashing individual income tax rates 
and reducing wealth-transfer taxes.1 The 2003 bill was an attempt to con-
tinue the assault on the nation’s progressive tax structure, just as the budget 
deficit was spiraling out of control.2 Meanwhile, the “war on terror” was in 
full swing. By the end of April 2003, well over 135,000 U.S. troops were 
deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq, and military spending was escalating at 
an alarming rate.3 The continued commitment to tax cuts during wartime 
seemed incongruous. How could lawmakers consider tax cuts, aimed mainly 
at the wealthy, at a time when many ordinary Americans were sacrificing 
life and limb overseas? To explain the apparent dissonance, then–House 
Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-TX) boldly declared that, “Nothing is more 
important in the face of a war than cutting taxes.”4 
DeLay’s remark was not mere political rhetoric. Just one month later, he 
followed through by joining his fellow House Republicans in passing a 
package of tax cuts that the Congressional Budget Office estimated would 
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 © 2009 Ajay K. Mehrotra, all rights reserved. 
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 Professor of Law & Louis F. Niezer Faculty Fellow, Adjunct Associate Professor of 
History, Co-Director, Center for Law, Society & Culture, Indiana University Maurer School of 
Law—Bloomington. Thanks to Chris Capozzola, Steve Conrad, Mary Dudziak, Dan Ernst, Leandra 
Lederman, Amanda Meglemre, Bill Popkin, Joel Slemrod, Nancy Staudt, Dennis Ventry, and the 
students in my Tax Policy course for their comments and suggestions. And to Collin McCready for 
outstanding research assistance, and the editors and staff of the Michigan Law Review for all their 
help. This Review expands on an earlier and shorter book review published in the Washington 
Monthly. Ajay K. Mehrotra, Pay To Win: Raising taxes during wartime has never been fun. Why 
other presidents did it, Wash. Monthly, Aug./Sept./Oct. 2008, at 51. 
 1. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 
Stat. 38. 
 2. See David E. Rosenbaum, White House Sees a $455 Billion Gap in the ’03 Budget: 
Would Be Biggest U.S. Deficit—Democrats Point to Tax Cuts, N.Y. Times, July 16, 2003, at A1. 
 3. Vernon Loeb, U.S. Military Will Leave Saudi Arabia This Year, Wash. Post, Apr. 30, 
2003, at A1. 
 4. Editorial, The Budget Fight is Now, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 2003, at A20. 
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drain nearly $61 billion from the federal treasury in 2003 alone.5 But this 
was only the beginning. From 2004 through 2006, the Bush White House 
and its congressional allies enacted a series of additional tax cuts as part of 
several broader, economic measures.6 Though these cuts were more modest 
than those enacted in 2001 and 2003, they came as the human and financial 
costs from the war on terror continued to mount. Commentators and critics 
questioned how American politicians could consistently ignore the obvious 
links between foreign policy and domestic tax law: how could our ostensible 
leaders neglect the American tradition of shared wartime sacrifice?7 
To be sure, lawmakers have not always been so oblivious to the price of 
conflict and the obligations of wartime fiscal citizenship. Throughout Amer-
ican history most political leaders have recognized that wars entail sacrifices 
on the home front as well as the battlefield. Indeed, just a few decades ago, 
DeLay’s 2003 words and deeds would have been unimaginable. In the 
1960s, back when military hawks were also deficit hawks, few leaders 
would have been able to justify tax cuts during wartime. As one Republican 
lawmaker succinctly explained during the height of the Vietnam conflict, “I 
just don’t see how we can be hawks on the war and then vote against taxes 
to pay for it.”8 
The contrast between recent and historical wartime tax policy is the sub-
ject of War and Taxes, the provocative and fascinating new book by tax 
scholars Steven A. Bank,9 Kirk J. Stark,10 and Joseph J. Thorndike.11 Using 
this contrast as their point of departure, the authors take on the important 
and timely question of whether there is any precedent in U.S. history for 
cutting taxes in the midst of war. Synthesizing earlier historical scholarship, 
the authors provide a rich and thorough reinterpretation of the varying so-
cial, political, and economic conditions that have animated fiscal 
policymaking during nearly every major U.S. conflict from the American 
                                                                                                                      
 5. Jonathan Weisman, $400 Billion-Plus Deficit For Fiscal '03 Seen by CBO, Wash. Post, 
June 11, 2003, at A4. 
 6. See, e.g., Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922; 
Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, 120 Stat. 345 (2006); 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418; Working Families Tax 
Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, 118 Stat. 1166. The tax-cutting trend did not go unnoticed 
by the popular press. Editorial, Another year, another tax cut, and look who’s cleaning up: Bush, 
Congress complicate IRS code, rewarding their favored interests, USA Today, May 17, 2006, at 
10A; David R. Francis, Why the rich get the most tax goodies, Christian Sci. Monitor, May 22, 
2006, at 15.  
 7. Robert D. Hormats, The Price of Liberty: Paying for America’s Wars (2007); E.J. 
Dionne, Jr., Editorial, A War Bush Wouldn’t Pay For, Wash. Post, Dec. 15, 2006, at A35; David M. 
Kennedy, What Is Patriotism Without Sacrifice? N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 2003, at WK3; David E. Ro-
senbaum, Tax Cuts and War Have Seldom Mixed, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 2003, at N17.  
 8. Norman C. Miller, Legislators Seem Likely To Back Johnson’s Plan For 6% Income Tax 
Rise: But They May Bar Big Boost In Social Security Levies And Benefits; Delay Seen, Wall St. J., 
Jan. 12, 1967, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 9. Vice Dean and Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. 
 10. Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. 
 11. Director of Tax History Project, Tax Analysts, and Scholar in Residence, University of 
Virginia. 
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Revolution to the two world wars and up to the present war on terror. Min-
ing the lessons of the past, their goal is to make readers aware of the 
complex and challenging circumstances that have prompted wartime Ameri-
can leaders to enact tax hikes. 
Although War and Taxes was written in the waning years of the Bush 
Administration, its research focus and historical findings remain salient. The 
recent economic downturn and the Obama Administration’s differing ap-
proach to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have certainly changed the 
calculus of wartime tax policy, but the long-term effects of the Bush Ad-
ministration’s deficit-inducing tax cuts and war expenditures will be felt for 
many years to come.12 Even more significant, the historical links between 
wartime taxation and fiscal citizenship have not only shaped the history of 
the modern American state; they are sure to influence future political and 
economic developments. 
The authors of War and Taxes, of course, are not the first to investigate 
the historical relationship between wars and taxes. Scholars have long iden-
tified national conflicts as the crucial catalysts in the creation of effective 
tax laws, policies, and administration. From the macrolevel historical soci-
ology of Charles Tilly,13 Margaret Levi,14 and Michael Mann;15 to the more 
microlevel analysis of British political development;16 to the recent accounts 
of twentieth-century American political and legal history;17 scholars have 
attended to the historical dynamics between wars, taxes, and the politics of 
fiscal citizenship. As the economic historian W. Elliot Brownlee has shown, 
wars frequently have been pivotal markers in American history, signaling 
the collapse of previous political and economic regimes, while ushering in 
the emergence of new fiscal orders.18 The authors recognize this undeniable 
                                                                                                                      
 12. Joseph F. Stiglitz & Linda Bilmes, The Three Billion Dollar War: The True 
Costs of the Iraq Conflict (2008). 
 13. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992 (rev. paper-
back ed. 1992); The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Charles Tilly ed., 1975). 
 14. Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (1988). 
 15. Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power 486–90 (1986); Michael Mann, State 
and Society, 1130–1815: An Analysis of English State Finances, 1 Pol. Power & Soc. Theory 165 
(1980). 
 16. John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–
1783 (1990); Martin Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 
1799–1914 (2001); Martin Daunton, Just Taxes: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914–
1979 (2002). 
 17. David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and 
War, 1929–1945 (1999); Mark H. Leff, The Politics of Sacrifice on the American Home Front in 
World War II, 77 J. Am. Hist. 1296 (1991). Bartholomew H. Sparrow, From the Outside In: 
World War II and the American State (1996). 
 18. W. Elliot Brownlee, Federal taxation in America: A Short History (1996); see 
also Steven R. Weisman, The Great Tax Wars: Lincoln to Wilson—The Fierce Battles 
over Money and Power That Transformed the Nation (2002); Sheldon D. Pollack, War, 
Revenue, and State Building: Financing the Development of the American State (2009). 
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fact, acknowledging that “the history of America’s tax system can be written 
largely as a history of America’s wars.”19 
Yet, what Bank, Stark, and Thorndike have to offer, beyond the lawyer’s 
and historian’s careful eye for the importance of legal doctrine and detail, is 
an emphasis on the fragile yet essential discourse of shared sacrifice that has 
motivated past wartime tax policymaking. Like other scholars writing about 
the history of fiscal policy,20 the authors identify taxation as a fundamental 
part of the social contract between states and their citizens. Although they 
acknowledge that the sacrifices of war can be borne in many ways, the au-
thors focus on the distribution of tax burdens during wartime as the primary 
means for measuring the fairness of shared sacrifice. With this metric, Bank, 
Stark, and Thorndike attempt to refrain from passing judgment on the recent 
Bush Administration’s wartime tax policies. Indeed, War and Taxes is not 
meant to be a partisan brief against the Republican Party’s recent penchant 
for tax cuts and deficit spending. Instead, the authors have set out to provide 
a judicious, yet ironic, account of the long history of wartime opposition to 
tax increases. 
In contrast to the conventional wisdom that presumes that wartime patri-
otism has always and everywhere trumped self-interest, the authors contend 
that “America’s history of wartime taxation is not quite the heroic tale that 
many Bush critics seem to imply” (p. xiii). War and Taxes seeks to remind 
readers that many previous lawmakers also resisted spreading the burden 
and costs of conflict on to the American people. Some of our most cele-
brated historical leaders have sought, as the authors put it, “to delay, deny, 
and obscure the trade-off between guns and butter” (p. xiii). In the past, 
even during popular wars, “elected representatives have often made room 
for self-indulgence, easing burdens for some constituents while raising them 
for others” (p. xiii). 
Although Bank, Stark, and Thorndike do not claim that America’s tradi-
tion of wartime sacrifice is a myth, they maintain that the reality of past 
wartime tax policymaking has been complex and contested. Conventional 
criticism “misses much of the complexity of American history. Indeed, as a 
nation, our commitment to wartime fiscal sacrifice has always been un-
easy—and more than a little ambiguous” (p. xiii). 
In their careful efforts to provide a balanced and measured history, how-
ever, the authors inevitably draw attention to the ultimately unprecedented 
fiscal policies pursued by American leaders from 2000 to 2006. And herein 
lies the irony: War and Taxes provides a valuable and necessary corrective to 
the overly romanticized history of wartime sacrifice, but despite its attempts 
to bracket the highly partisan and ideological aspects of our recent wartime 
                                                                                                                      
 19. P. xii. Though War and Taxes uses the end of particular conflicts to frame certain histori-
cal periods, the authors seem cognizant of the constructed nature of wartime. For more on the 
temporal aspects of twentieth-century American wars and the contingent effects on legal historiog-
raphy, see Mary L. Dudziak, Law, War, and the History of Time (Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch., Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 09-6, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=1374454. 
 20. See, for example, the essays collected in The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in 
Comparative and Historical Perspective (Isaac William Martin et. al. eds., 2009).  
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tax policies, the book can also be read as a damning indictment of recent 
Republican tax policy. Past leaders may have contested and cloaked the 
need for wartime tax hikes, fearing the political consequences or biding time 
for more opportune moments. Eventually, however, they all gave in. Only 
the Bush Administration and its congressional allies resolutely failed to ac-
cept fiscal responsibilities. Other analysts have been more explicit in their 
condemnation of the Bush Administration and ideologically driven tax 
cuts,21 but Bank, Stark, and Thorndike provide a subtle, indirect—and per-
haps even more effective—critique of recent Republican wartime tax 
policies. 
Undergirding the ideas of shared wartime sacrifice, which are at the 
heart of War and Taxes, are even more profound questions about the precise 
meaning of the obligations and responsibilities of belonging to a political 
community. The vast and rich historical and legal scholarship on civic en-
gagement and national identity has rigorously documented how the 
obligations of citizenship,22 especially during wartime,23 entail heightened 
sacrifices among members of a liberal democracy,24 and how those sacrifices 
illustrate the greater trust that citizens place in their political leaders during 
national emergencies.25 Much less attention, however, has been paid to the 
other side of citizenship—the increased responsibilities of political leaders 
and policymakers to maintain such trust. If civic responsibilities require citi-
zens to forgo certain activities and at times even surrender life and liberty, 
then surely public officials must have a reciprocal duty to ensure that such 
sacrifice is shared by all members of a political community. The politics of 
fiscal citizenship thus requires the state, as a relatively autonomous actor, to 
exercise the discipline and authority to ensure that the price of conflict is 
spread evenly across class, region, and even generation. 
                                                                                                                      
 21. See, e.g., Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the 
New Gilded Age (2008); Paul Krugman, The Conscience of a Liberal (2007); Stiglitz and 
Bilmes, supra note 12. 
 22. See, e.g., Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and 
the Obligations of Citizenship (1998); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse 
and Revival of American Community (2000). Tax scholars have similarly identified the salience 
of paying taxes to fiscal citizenship. See Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Equity versus Efficiency and the U.S. 
Tax System in Historical Perspective, in Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate 25 (Joseph J. 
Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 
60 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2006);  Assaf Likhovski, “Training in Citizenship”: Tax Compliance and Moder-
nity, 32 Law & Soc. Inquiry 665 (2007); Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and 
the Civic Virtues of a Tax Return Filing Requirement, 61 Tax L. Rev. 53 (2007). 
 23. See, e.g., Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the 
Making of the Modern American Citizen (2008); Robert B. Westbrook, Why We Fought: 
Forging American Obligations in World War II (2004); Leff, supra note 17; James T. Sparrow, 
“Buying Our Boys Back”: The Mass Foundations of Fiscal Citizenship in World War II, 20 J. Pol’y 
Hist. 263 (2008). 
 24. Precisely measuring individual sacrifice, in the sense of who is worse off because of a 
war, is difficult to do, but as War and Taxes shows, American politicians have regularly resorted to 
the trope of “shared wartime sacrifice” to marshal support for their policies. See p. 172. 
 25. On the importance of trust for the functioning of modern political institutions, see gener-
ally Trust and Governance (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998). 
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This Review proceeds in four parts, paralleling the chronological or-
ganization of War and Taxes. It focuses mainly on the book’s analysis of the 
leading modern American wars, from the Civil War through the global con-
flicts of the twentieth century, up to the recent war on terror. Part I contrasts 
the tax policies of the Union and Confederacy during the Civil War to show 
how the Lincoln Administration was able to overcome Yankee resistance to 
wartime tax hikes to wage a war against a Southern Confederacy that reso-
lutely resisted any type of centralized taxation until, of course, it was too 
late. 
Part II investigates the two world wars, which together may arguably 
represent the “golden age” of shared wartime sacrifice. During both of these 
conflicts, Americans seemed willing to embrace the need for greater fiscal 
and other sacrifices. They appeared to trust their political leaders, who exer-
cised newly coercive powers, to try to spread the price of conflict evenly 
across the populace. Consequently, the two world wars were critical to the 
development of the modern American tax regime and the idealized mean-
ings of fiscal citizenship. With the world war experiences as a pivotal 
background, Part III turns to an examination of the early Cold War. The con-
trast between the Korean and Vietnam conflicts illustrates the importance of 
timing and how acute political leadership, attuned to contemporary social 
conditions, can be vital for the making of effective wartime tax policy. 
Part IV explores the more recent war on terror, and how it became sub-
sumed by the Republican Party’s ideological commitment to tax cuts and 
supply-side economics. As the authors of War and Taxes duly note, the im-
mediate post-9/11 period remains too close to our own experiences to permit 
objective, detached historical judgment. Still, the recent inability of our po-
litical leaders, on both sides of the aisle, to reconcile the price of conflict 
with the need for shared sacrifice demonstrates the sea change in thinking 
about tax policy that has occurred over the course of the twentieth century. 
This essay concludes with some closing observations about the main schol-
arly contributions of War and Taxes, including how the Bush Administration 
may have permanently transformed American thinking about wartime tax 
policy and the meaning of fiscal citizenship. 
I. The Civil War and a Telling Contrast 
The importance of wartime fiscal discipline was perhaps most evident 
during the Civil War. Indeed, as the authors show, the contrast between how 
the Union and the Confederacy financed the war is instructive of the pro-
found and consequential difference between exercising and abdicating the 
responsibilities of fiscal citizenship. Whereas the South stubbornly main-
tained its resistance to spreading the sacrifices of the war, Northern leaders 
eventually recognized the need to enact significant tax hikes and other ex-
acting wartime measures. 
Initially, both Northern and Southern leaders dodged and disavowed the 
need for painful fiscal sacrifices. Each side believed that the conflict would 
be short and painless, and such optimism permeated social commentators 
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and political leaders alike. At the start of the war, leading Northern newspa-
per editors prematurely suggested that business elites throughout the country 
would soon come to their senses and help unite the divided nation. The Lin-
coln Administration’s first Treasury Secretary, Salmon P. Chase, similarly 
contended that “the great body of the citizens, now involved in the calami-
ties of insurrection, will, ere long, become satisfied that order and peace, 
and security for all personal and political rights, in the Union and the under 
the Constitution, are preferable to disorder and conflict” (p. 35). In his ef-
forts to achieve peace and order, President Lincoln relied originally on 
traditional sources of federal revenue to finance what he and his aides be-
lieved would be a short conflict. The tariff, excise taxes, sales of public land, 
and the issuance of federal debt remained the main sources of Union re-
ceipts at the beginning of the Civil War.26 
Southern leaders, for their part, believed that the righteousness of their 
cause would quickly convince the North to end the conflict. Confederate 
President Jefferson Davis frequently claimed that the South, like the Found-
ing Fathers, was fighting for the “sacred right of self-government”; nothing 
short of the preservation of republican liberty was at stake.27 “[T]he people 
of the North are deluded to believe,” wrote one Southern periodical, “that it 
is in their power to subjugate us and force us back into political union with 
them” (pp. 26–27). This “strange infatuation,” the editors concluded, “can-
not endure very long” (pp. 26–27). The Confederacy’s military leaders 
initially seemed to agree, but it did not take long before both sides realized 
that the war’s duration would be long and its costs steep. 
Yet, as the price of the conflict escalated and budget deficits soared on 
each side of the Mason-Dixon Line, only Northern leaders were able to 
marshal the political will to spread the burdens of wartime sacrifice equita-
bly. Soon after the Confederate victory at Manassas—the seminal July 1861 
battle that tested the Union’s military and psychological resolve—President 
Lincoln authorized the enlistment of a million men.28 Congressional leaders, 
prompted by the call for greater military service and the need for increased 
revenue, responded by raising import duties and enacting a national levy on 
land, the first U.S. income tax, and an excise tax on all manufactured goods. 
Ensuing resistance to the property tax and the manufacturers’ tax under-
scored how even some Yankees contested the calls for shared sacrifice.29 
With Lincoln’s leadership, however, Union officials were able to dissipate 
such protest. In the process, they helped establish not only the economic 
                                                                                                                      
 26. Sheldon D. Pollack, The Failure of U.S. Tax Policy: Revenue and Politics 39 
(1996); Robert Stanley, Dimensions of Law in the Service of Order: Origins of the Fed-
eral Income Tax, 1861–1913, at 30–32 (1993). 
 27. James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era 310 (1988). 
 28. Id. at 348. The North referred to the battle of Manassas as Bull Run. Yet, regardless of 
the name, the battle tested the mettle of Northern leaders and citizens. Id. at 346–48.   
 29. Though War and Taxes analyzes the resistance to the manufacturer’s tax, the book only 
briefly mentions the opposition to the 1861 property tax, perhaps because the measure proved inef-
fective in raising revenue, or perhaps because the constitutional obstacles to its effectiveness may 
have rendered it more symbolic than substantive. See Hormats, supra note 7, at 63–68. 
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foundations for the successful financing of the war, but also a model for 
subsequent American wartime tax policy. 
Eventually, the lack of national administrative capacity to assess and 
collect the new Union taxes limited their effectiveness. Little revenue was 
collected from the 1861 property or income taxes. Still, Northern leaders 
remained resolute in their attention to the distributional impact of wartime 
policies. As Union expenditures continued to mount, and as the conscription 
of the country’s young—and often least well-off—men began, the social 
demands for greater financial sacrifice from the affluent became more stri-
dent. Policymakers understood that conscription was a form of sacrifice, a 
kind of tax on human capital.30 The Union responded with a series of reve-
nue acts in 1862 and 1864 that dramatically altered the federal fiscal 
landscape. These new tax laws, as Bank, Stark, and Thorndike note, became 
a watershed for Civil War financing: “the percentage of tax revenues derived 
from internal taxes increased substantially, with income tax receipts more 
than tripling. These acts marked the culmination of a radical shift in the sys-
tem of federal financing over a short period” (p. 43). 
To be sure, the Civil War tax hikes did not come without resistance. And 
War and Taxes provides sufficient evidence—from the protests against the 
manufacturers’ taxes to the gory violence against the draft—to show the 
limits of Yankee patriotism, and thus support the book’s thesis about the 
ambiguity of wartime sacrifice. Nonetheless, Northern leaders did not aban-
don their responsibilities under the social contract. While many Northern 
citizens fulfilled their obligations to the Union as soldiers, taxpayers, and 
bondholders, government officials in Washington did their part to hew to the 
ideals of shared wartime sacrifice. They may not have extracted as much tax 
revenue or fiscal sacrifice as government actors in subsequent American 
wars, but they went a long way toward maintaining the faith and trust of 
most citizens by spreading the price of conflict among a wider cross-section 
of the Northern population.31 
The striking contrast between Northern and Southern tax policy pro-
vides an even stronger case for the significance of aspiring to an ideal of 
shared wartime sacrifice. With its mix of regressive consumption taxes and 
graduated income levies, President Lincoln’s Republican Party was able to 
project the image—if not the reality—that all Northern citizens were sup-
porting the war equally. Although the combination of excise and income 
taxes served the dual strategic purposes of raising revenues while containing 
inflation, Republican lawmakers were able to employ the rhetoric of patriot-
                                                                                                                      
 30. Union conscription was particularly unequal because it permitted the hiring of substitutes 
and exemptions for those who were willing to pay $300. For more on how conscription resembled 
taxation, see Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State 
Authority in America, 1859–1877, at 138 (1990). 
 31. In fact, the northeast industrial states, led by New York, paid the vast bulk of the Civil 
War income taxes. New York alone paid roughly one-third of the tax collected, and seven northeast-
ern states plus California collectively paid about 70 percent of income-tax revenues. Stanley, 
supra note 26, at 40–42; John F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal In-
come Tax 70 (1985). 
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ism and shared sacrifice to frame the paying of new robust taxes as a form 
of loyalty to the Union. Even Confederate leaders were left astonished by 
the extent of Northern commitments. “The most sagacious foresight could 
not have predicted,” Jefferson Davis bemoaned during the war, “that the 
passions of the Northern people would lead them blindly to the sacrifice of 
life, treasure, and liberty.”32 
By contrast, the Confederacy—buoyed by its misplaced military confi-
dence and burdened by its antidemocratic political culture—continued to 
resist nearly any form of centralized taxation until it was too late.33 Jefferson 
Davis succinctly explained how the early decisions to forgo fiscal sacrifice 
created the institutional inertia that eventually crippled the South’s wartime 
tax policy. “A long exemption from direct taxation by the General Govern-
ment had created an aversion to its raising revenue by any other means than 
by duties on imports,” wrote Davis, “and it was supposed that these duties 
would be ample for current peace expenditure, while the means for conduct-
ing the war could be raised almost exclusively by the use of the public 
credit.”34 The South did, ultimately, turn to a combination of income and prof-
its taxes, along with levies on a whole host of businesses and commercial 
transactions, but with little time to create the administrative capacity needed to 
collect these taxes, they proved to be more symbolic than substantive. 
In the end, the Civil War experience resoundingly illustrates the incon-
gruity that undergirds the main argument of War and Taxes. Though the 
authors seek to emphasize that “the commitment among Northern taxpayers 
to the ideal of shared sacrifice was just as uneasy as in the South” (p. 39), 
the historical record appears to belie that claim. At the start, Abraham Lin-
coln and his Republican allies may have resisted tax hikes, relying instead 
on traditional sources of revenue, but unlike Jefferson Davis, Lincoln and 
other Union officials eventually prevailed in raising taxes. They marshaled 
the political will to challenge opponents of tax increases and to advance not 
only the country’s first progressive income taxes, but also the notion that the 
politics of fiscal citizenship required the state to spread the costs of war 
evenly across class and region. 
II. The Two World Wars and the “Golden Age” of  
Shared Wartime Sacrifice 
If the Civil War provides some mixed evidence in support of War and 
Taxes’ primary thesis, the two world wars seem to challenge the contention 
that American leaders and citizens have been reluctant to embrace a tradi-
tion of wartime sacrifice. Indeed, as the authors acknowledge, World War II 
                                                                                                                      
 32. 8 The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events 271 (Frank Moore ed., 1865).  
 33. On how antebellum Southern taxation cultivated an antidemocratic political culture, see 
Robin L. Einhorn, American Taxation, American Slavery (2006). 
 34. P. 27. There were other differences, too: while the North relied on a variety of broad-
based taxes to underwrite the war, the South’s main reliance on printed money and unsupported 
public debt led to disastrous inflation. Id.  
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provides the “most compelling example of wartime fiscal sacrifice” (p. xiv). 
In fact, if one considers the two world wars as a continuation of one major 
global conflagration, as some historians have suggested,35 then the first half 
of the twentieth century may appear to be the “golden age” of shared war-
time sacrifice, when a war to make the world “safe for democracy”36 was 
followed by the quintessential “Good War.”37 
A. World War I Fiscal Policy as a Tale of Unintended Consequences 
Although Americans were initially divided over U.S. entry into World 
War I, once the country officially entered the fray in April 1917 most citi-
zens seemed willing to sacrifice on behalf of the war effort. Public officials, 
for their part, did not hesitate to harness wartime patriotism. As part of the 
war mobilization effort, lawmakers pushed through a tremendous amount of 
unprecedented government intervention into American private life, includ-
ing a new and highly robust wartime tax regime. Still, while state actors 
attempted to spread the costs of the conflict among nearly all sectors of so-
ciety, broader economic and political forces often undermined their 
objectives. 
From the start, national leaders were well aware of the opportunity that 
the Great War afforded for stoking nationalistic fervor, or what Herbert 
Hoover, the wartime head of the Federal Food Administration, referred to as 
“the spirit of self-sacrifice.”38 With his calls for “meatless” Tuesdays, and 
“wheatless” Wednesdays, President Woodrow Wilson relied heavily on pa-
triotic sentiment and cooperation to encourage food conservation and other 
wartime sacrifices.39 
Yet, although conservation measures were backed by patriotic coopera-
tion, political pressure was hardly absent during WWI. From conscription to 
the limits on free speech to the rise of vigilantism, public and private coer-
cion were central components in enforcing wartime obligations.40 In the area 
of fiscal policy, government compulsion was more subtle. Americans were 
convinced through a sophisticated form of government propaganda that they 
                                                                                                                      
 35. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991, at 
21–54 (1996) (1994); c.f. Dudziak, supra note 19, at 13–19 (discussing the difficulty of determining 
the temporal limits of World War II). But see Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A 
Global History of World War II 1 (2d ed. 2005) (arguing that the two world wars were distinct). 
Other scholars have gone further in depicting the continuities of twentieth-century conflicts into one 
“Long War.” See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles 24 (2003).  
 36. Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History 317 (1994). 
 37. Michael C. C. Adams, The Best War Ever: America and World War II 2 (1994). 
 38. David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society 119 
(25th anniversary ed. 2004). 
 39. Id. at 118; see also Capozzola, supra note 23, at 53–54. 
 40. Capozzola, supra note 23, at 21–54. Unsurprisingly, legal historians have focused 
considerable attention on the WWI limits to free speech, and the repercussions of these limits on 
modern constitutional law. See, e.g., Richard Polenberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, 
the Supreme Court, and Free Speech (1987); David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgot-
ten Years (1997). 
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had a patriotic duty to buy government bonds and other public debt. Like-
wise, wartime lawmakers felt pressure to solidify the quasi-voluntary 
compliance that undergirded nearly all modern tax systems.41 Treasury offi-
cials did this by trying to build public trust and assuring taxpayers that all 
citizens were paying their fair share of war costs.42 Not only did politicians 
sense that they could raise taxes during the height of war patriotism, taxing 
authorities realized that the compliance costs of collecting taxes could be 
lower when taxpayers–citizens were more likely to pay to support the war 
effort.43 Consequently, the political and economic debates over the mix of 
taxes and debt financing became increasingly significant. 
At the start of the conflict, the Wilson Administration firmly sought to 
divide the costs of the war evenly between current taxes and government 
borrowing. In his 1917 war message to Congress, Wilson stated, “so far as 
practicable the burden of the war should be borne by taxation of the present 
generation rather than by loans.”44 Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo 
confirmed that “fifty per cent of the cost of the War should be financed by” 
taxation, contending that “one of the most fatal mistakes that governments 
have made in all countries has been the failure to impose fearlessly and 
promptly upon the existing generation a fair burden of the cost of war.”45 
This early desire to balance the war costs was motivated by concerns about 
intergenerational and socioeconomic equity.46 The Wilson Administration 
thus appeared to be cognizant of its social and ethical obligations to monitor 
the distributional effects of war financing. 
The steeply progressive tax laws enacted during the war further sup-
ported the notion that political leaders were maintaining their end of the 
social contract; that they were attempting to adhere to the ideal of shared 
wartime sacrifice. Though the first permanent income tax was in place be-
fore U.S. entry into the war, traditional sources of revenue, namely, import 
duties and excise taxes, dominated federal receipts—that is until the war 
hastened the arrival of a new fiscal order. By synthesizing previous histori-
cal scholarship, Bank, Stark, and Thorndike remind us that “[d]espite the 
                                                                                                                      
 41. On the historical importance of “quasi-voluntary compliance,” see generally Levi, supra 
note 14. 
 42. Kennedy, supra note 38, at 99–101; Ajay K. Mehrotra, Lawyers, Guns & Public Mon-
ies: The U.S. Treasury, World War One, and the Administration of the Modern Fiscal State, 28 Law 
& Hist. Rev. 173 (2010). 
 43. For more on the economic connections between wartime patriotism and lower tax-
compliance costs, see Naomi Feldman & Joel Slemrod, War and Taxation: When Does Patriotism 
Overcome the Free-Rider Impulse, in The New Fiscal Sociology, supra note 20, at 138. 
 44. Charles Gilbert, American Financing of World War I 84 (1970).  
 45. Id.; see also William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years: The Reminiscences of William 
G. McAdoo 389–90 (1931); Dale N. Shook, William G. McAdoo and the Development of 
National Economic Policy, 1913–1918, at 263–64 (1987); McAdoo Talks Over Loan at Lunch 
with Bankers, Wall St. J., May 5, 1917, at 8. 
 46. The issue of fiscal policy and intergenerational equity has become increasingly relevant 
for present tax scholars and policymakers. See, e.g., Symposium, What Does Our Legal System Owe 
Future Generations? New Analyses of Intergenerational Justice for a New Century, 77 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 1135 (2009). 
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speed with which the system converted to reliance on ‘soak-the-rich’ taxa-
tion, the compulsory prong of the fiscal sacrifice campaign was an 
unparalleled success” (p. 50). 
Indeed, as the war costs escalated, the federal government assiduously 
exercised its newfound taxing powers. Top individual marginal income tax 
rates soared from a prewar level of 7% to 77% at the height of the conflict; 
the percentage of the labor force paying income taxes increased from 
roughly 2% to nearly 17%, and monies generated from income and profits 
taxes mushroomed from less than 10% of total federal revenues in 1914 to 
nearly 60% by the end of the war.47 The tax system that took shape during 
the war, thus, had a distinctively redistributive edge.48 In fact, the effective 
tax rate of the nation’s wealthiest 1% of households soared from roughly 3% 
in 1916 to 15% within two years.49 Accordingly, WWI tax laws occasioned, 
as the historian David Kennedy has documented, “a fiscal revolution in the 
United States.”50 Rates would drop dramatically after the war, but the use of 
direct and graduated taxes to fund the treasury became a permanent part of 
the modern American fiscal state well after the conflict ended. 
One reason why lawmakers were able to make such radical changes to 
the existing tax system was because of the incredible prevalence of wartime 
profiteering. During the war years (1914–1919), American industries in-
volved in military production saw their bottom lines and their stock prices 
soar to new heights. The price of Bethlehem Steel stock, for instance, in-
creased seventeenfold, and in 1917 the company paid its shareholders a 200 
percent dividend. U.S. Steel and General Motors enjoyed similar gains. And 
the Du Pont Company, known colloquially as the “Powder Trust” because of 
its monopoly on the military-powder business, saw its already-prosperous 
business skyrocket during the war with profits increasing more than ten-
fold.51 
Although War and Taxes acknowledges the importance of profiteering to 
the enactment of a munitions tax and then later a more general excess-
profits levy,52 the book underestimates the pivotal role that populist and pro-
                                                                                                                      
 47. See Mehrotra, supra note 42, at 182, Tble 1.  
 48. It was redistributive in the sense that it relied mainly on the wealthy for tax revenue, 
while the entire country benefited from greater military spending. 
 49. W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in Does 
Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich, 29, 45 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 
2000); see also Series Ea 758–772, Federal income tax rates by income group-average rates: 1913–
1960, in Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennium Edition (Susan B. Carter et 
al. eds., 2006) (showing federal income tax rates by income and year). Effective tax rates refer to the 
ratio of a taxpayer’s tax liability to income.  
 50. Kennedy, supra note 38, at 112. 
 51. Stuart D. Brandes, Warhogs: A History of War Profits in America 133–34 
(1997). While profits and return on equity were increasing rapidly for specific war-related indus-
tries, equity markets as a whole were slumping in real terms, thus fueling the public outcry in favor 
of taxing these highly-profitable businesses and their owners and managers. Id. at 136. 
 52. Pp. 56–57. The 1916 munitions tax was, in fact, a rifle-shot provision aimed squarely at 
the Du Pont Company, which was responsible for 90 percent of the revenues generated from this 
new levy. Brandes, supra note 51, at 134–35. 
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gressive lawmakers played in exploiting the public outrage over war profi-
teering.53 The book places much greater emphasis, instead, on the functional 
aspects of wartime tax policy. It seems to suggest that the muscular WWI 
tax system that took shape was the result almost solely of the forces of sup-
ply and demand. The decline in tariff revenue, due to the instability of 
international trade, limited the supply of traditional sources of funds, and 
the obvious demand for more revenue certainly drove lawmakers to search 
for new sources of public monies. 
Yet, by focusing on the purely instrumental motives of lawmakers, the 
authors seem to ascribe a certain degree of inevitability to the decisions of 
contemporaries. In the process, they obscure the historical contingency and 
plasticity of the war period. The war emergency, of course, provided the 
critical context for building a new fiscal order, but the precise parameters of 
that new regime had been hotly contested for decades. Thus during the war 
crisis the future of American tax policy was open to multiple possible paths 
of development.54 Populist agrarian groups in the late nineteenth century, for 
example, had consistently been demanding steeply progressive income and 
wealth taxes,55 and several progressive lawmakers from the West and South 
attempted to use the war emergency and the wartime tax regime to curb the 
growth of corporate capitalism and establish a seemingly more egalitarian 
distribution of wealth.56 At the same time, business interests, as War and 
Taxes shows, resisted the wartime tax hikes, and numerous conservative pol-
icy analysts argued that steeply progressive income and profits taxes would 
hinder war mobilization.57 None of these social groups and political leaders 
ultimately triumphed, but each in its own way helped shape the outcome of 
WWI tax policy, suggesting that the functional demand for revenue was far 
from the only determinant of wartime fiscal policy.  
The authors, to their credit, do not minimize the contestation that ac-
companied the new wartime tax regime. Uncovering wartime tax protest, 
after all, is essential to their main argument. And thus they persuasively 
document how Du Pont opposed the munitions tax, and how broader busi-
ness coalitions fought the enactment of the excess-profits levy (p. 55). This 
is no small contribution given that many current commentators have more 
often assumed than demonstrated that patriotism always muffles tax pro-
tests.58  
                                                                                                                      
 53. Kennedy, supra note 38, at 109–10. 
 54. War and Taxes follows the traditional historiography by contending that WWI was the 
culmination of the Progressive Era. P. 49. More recent accounts of Progressivism, however, have 
begun to call this periodization into question. See, e.g., Maureen A. Flanagan, America Re-
formed: Progressives and Progressivism, 1890–1920s (2006). 
 55. Elizabeth Sanders, The Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American 
State, 1877–1917, at 226–30 (1999); Charles Postel, The Populist Vision 159–61 (2007). 
 56. Kennedy, supra note 38, at 108; Witte, supra note 31, at 81–84. 
 57. Pp. 54–55; see also Kennedy supra note 37, at 106–13.  
 58. See sources cited supra note 7. 
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War and Taxes makes an equally important contribution to the reinterpre-
tation of the success of the government’s wartime bond drives. The Wilson 
Administration soon realized that military spending would overwhelm the 
initial promise of using progressive taxes to finance half the war. To under-
write the war effort, Treasury Secretary McAdoo turned to a propaganda 
blitzkrieg promoting the sale of “Liberty Loans,” a variety of below-market 
government debt. McAdoo easily resorted to the hyperbole of conflict and 
shared sacrifice to mobilize support for Liberty Loans.59 He also enlisted the 
services of national celebrities and leading political figures to mobilize sup-
port for Liberty Loans (p. 59). 
As a result of McAdoo’s actions, scholars have presumed that the WWI 
bond drives were an overwhelming success, signifying the tremendous ex-
tent of ordinary Americans’ willingness to share in wartime sacrifice.60  But, 
as Bank, Stark, and Thorndike show, investing in these submarket bonds 
was hardly a sacrifice when one considers that the interest from these gov-
ernment securities was frequently tax-exempt, and that the appeal of these 
tax-exempt investments was heightened by the steeply graduated marginal 
tax rates in effect at the time.61 Of course, not all bond investors were mem-
bers of the highest tax brackets, and the “success” of the mass bond drives 
may have had more to do with the creation of a new class of American in-
vestors,62 than with reinforcing a sense of civic identity. Ultimately, though, 
the combination of steep marginal rates and tax-exempt securities, as War 
and Taxes suggests, inured to the benefit of the nation’s most affluent own-
ers of capital. 
Despite these important scholarly contributions, the Great War proves to 
be a difficult example to sustain the book’s central claim that “the sentiment 
for fiscal sacrifice was strained and contested” (p. 50). Business groups, to 
be sure, kept their self-interest in mind as they made “pleas for exemptions 
or protests against provisions targeted at them” (p. 50). But American politi-
cal leaders held fast to their wartime responsibilities. They may have sent 
mixed signals by simultaneously enacting steeply progressive taxes and  
                                                                                                                      
 59. McAdoo, supra note 45, at 374–79. Reflecting back on his success, McAdoo explained 
that “[a]ny great war must necessarily be a popular movement. It is a kind of crusade; and, like all 
crusades, it sweeps along on a powerful stream of romanticism.” Id. at 374. McAdoo claimed suc-
cess in his financing efforts because he was able to harness—critics would say manipulate—the 
emotional potency of war. “We went direct to the people; and that means to everybody—to business 
men, workmen, farmers, bankers, millionaires, school-teachers, laborers,” McAdoo boasted in his 
memoirs. Id. at 378. “We capitalized the profound impulse called patriotism. It is the quality of 
coherence that holds a nation together; it is one of the deepest and most powerful of human mo-
tives.” Id. at 378–79.  
 60. Weisman, supra note 18, at 324–25; Gilbert, supra note 44. 
 61. P. 60. Economic historians have recently documented more precisely the limits of sacri-
fice associated with tax-advantaged liberty loans. Sung Won Kang & Hugh Rockoff, Capitalizing 
Patriotism: The Liberty Loans of World War I 12–13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 11919, 2006).  
 62. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Speculation Economy: How Finance Triumphed 
Over Industry 192–208 (2007); Julia C. Ott, “The Free and Open People’s Market”: Political 
Ideology and Retail Brokerage at the New York Stock Exchange, 1913–1933, 96 J. Amer. Hist. 44 
(June 2009).   
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issuing tax-favored government debt, but the most adverse aspects of WWI 
financing were frequently the result of unintended consequences, rather than 
any deliberate attempt by policymakers to conceal or deny the true costs of 
the war.63 
Consider, for example, the way in which Treasury officials inadvertently 
fueled wartime inflation. In its eagerness to sell war bonds, the Treasury 
Department encouraged individual investors to use borrowed funds to buy 
government securities; it also permitted banks to buy such debt directly. 
These actions, together with changes to the nascent Federal Reserve System, 
exacerbated inflationary pressures by encouraging private consumption 
while at the same time increasing the money supply.64 As a result, public 
borrowing and monetary policy became significant sources of WWI financ-
ing.65 Thus, notwithstanding McAdoo’s claims to have learned from the past, 
the policies and actions of the WWI Treasury Department were remarkably 
similar to the Civil War era. The ease with which political leaders could em-
ploy patriotism to issue government debt was mixed with the unanticipated 
results that came from a resort to easy money. 
In this sense, World War I seems both to support and undermine the 
main argument in War and Taxes. The authors persuasively demonstrate that 
not all citizens embraced the American tradition of shared wartime sacrifice. 
Yet, political leaders cannot be faulted for trying “to delay, deny, and ob-
scure the trade-off between guns and butter” (p. xiii). Rather than 
purposefully abdicating their fiscal responsibilities, WWI lawmakers pur-
sued seemingly rational policies that ultimately frustrated their true 
intentions to spread the costs of the war. 
B. World War II and the Sustained Commitment  
to Shared Wartime Sacrifice 
Broader economic and social forces may have undermined the intentions 
of WWI policymakers, but many of these public officials learned a great 
deal from their experiences in the wartime Wilson Administration. Arthur A. 
Ballantine, the Solicitor of Internal Revenue during World War I,66 helped 
defend the constitutionality of the WWI excess-profits tax.67 After the war, 
he became a leading member of the New York tax bar,68 but he did not lose 
                                                                                                                      
 63. Kennedy, supra note 38, at 99–103; see Mehrotra, supra note 42, at 207-212.  
 64. Kennedy, supra note 38, at 102–03. 
 65. The economic historian Hugh Rockoff has estimated that WWI was financed with rough-
ly 20% from taxes, 20% from money creation, and the remaining 60% from public borrowing. Hugh 
Rockoff, Until its Over, Over There: The U.S. Economy in World War I, in The Economics of 
World War I 310, 316 (Stephen Broadberry & Mark Harrison eds., 2005). 
 66. Melvin I. Urofsky, Ballantine, Arthur Atwood, in Dictionary of American Biography 
33–34 (John A. Garraty ed., Supp. VI 1980); Mehrotra, supra note 42, at 189.  
 67. Arthur A. Ballantine, Some Constitutional Aspects of the Excess Profits Tax, 29 Yale 
L.J. 625, 627 (1920). 
 68. Mehrotra, supra note 42, at 220. 
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sight of the important work he did during the war to build the administrative 
infrastructure of the modern American fiscal state.69 
In fact, in 1931, when Ballantine was Assistant Secretary of the Treas-
ury, he reflected on his role at the Bureau of Internal Revenue to argue that 
some kind of war-profits tax was an ideal way to raise revenue and temper 
the financial appetites of American capitalists. Testifying before the War 
Policies Commission, Ballantine maintained that “any plan of war revenue 
legislation should include a war profits tax designed to bring into Treasury, 
so far as practical, the entire amount of profits due to war.”70 As a longtime 
corporate lawyer, Ballantine had expressed his disdain for excessive taxa-
tion, but a war emergency necessitated a different kind of relationship 
between citizen–taxpayers and their government. “The need of the govern-
ment for funds to support the war and the general desire,” Ballantine 
testified, “to eliminate profit from war would both be furthered by” the en-
actment of wartime profits taxes.71 
Although Ballantine did not serve in the WWII Treasury Department, 
his sentiments were shared by many officials in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
administration. In what is perhaps the book’s most compelling account, 
the authors show how the sense of civic engagement triggered by the at-
tacks on Pearl Harbor spurred a second fiscal revolution (p. 93). Indeed, 
FDR took the politics of fiscal citizenship to new heights. He not only 
forcefully spoke about the need for shared sacrifice; he went so far as to 
implement a mass-based income-tax system that has become the bedrock 
of the modern American fiscal regime (p. 93). Like their predecessors, 
Roosevelt aides understood, especially after the immediate post–Pearl 
Harbor panic had subsided, that they needed to bring the pains of a remote 
wartime battlefield closer to home. They needed citizens to understand 
why self-sacrifice was crucial to the self-preservation of the political 
community (p. 97). 
There was perhaps no better way for lawmakers to convey the signifi-
cance of self-sacrifice than through the fiscal policies that underwrote the 
WWII mobilization effort. Having learned from the WWI experience, New 
Deal officials attempted to uphold the government’s commitment to realiz-
ing the ideal of shared wartime sacrifice. Treasury Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau, Jr. conducted a wartime bond campaign that would have made 
McAdoo proud. Treasury’s War Finance Committee supervised eight major 
bond drives that raised more than $157 billion, with roughly 85 million 
Americans investing in war bonds.72 Though the WWII bonds helped pay for 
the war and curb inflation, Morgenthau conceded that “60 percent of the 
                                                                                                                      
 69. Id. at 189.  
 70. Arthur A. Ballantine, War Policies in Taxation: Statement Before the War Policies Com-
mission (May 20, 1931) (transcript available at the National Archives and Record Administration II, 
College Park, MD). An abridged version of Ballantine’s testimony was published in The Tax Maga-
zine, July 1931.  War Policies in Taxation, 9 Tax Mag. 250 (1931). 
 71. Ballantine, supra note 70. 
 72. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 626; Sparrow, supra note 23, at 266.  
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reason” for the bond drive was “to give the people an opportunity to do 
something,” and “make the country war-minded.”  He used the bond drives 
to “sell the war, rather than vice versa.”73   
The WWII bond drives may have used the same script as the WWI cam-
paign for Liberty Loans, but when it came to tax policy New Dealers wrote 
their own drama. Indeed, the Roosevelt Administration’s enthusiasm for the 
political use of bonds was surpassed vastly by the incremental manipulation 
of tax policy. Even before the United States entered the war, Roosevelt had 
asked the American people to put “patriotism ahead of pocketbooks,” as he 
reminded Congress: “I have called for personal sacrifice,” and “[a] part of 
the sacrifice means the payment of more money in taxes” (pp. 90–91). FDR 
and congressional Democrats backed up this rhetoric with the reinstatement 
of a “steeply graduated” excess-profits tax in 1940 (p. 88). Enacted soon 
after the adoption of a draft, the excess-profits levy expressed Roosevelt’s 
desire to fulfill the state’s obligations under fiscal citizenship. “We are ask-
ing even our humblest citizens to contribute their mite,” FDR declared as 
part of his request for the excess-profits tax (p. 88). “It is our duty to see that 
the burden is equitably distributed according to ability to pay so that a few 
do not gain from the sacrifices of the many” (p. 88). 
Once the United States entered the war in 1941, certain political leaders 
focused on the need to use broad-based taxes to fund the war in a way that 
highlighted the notion of shared sacrifice. Some policymakers, for instance, 
argued for a general sales tax, but FDR adamantly opposed what he deemed 
to be a regressive method of public financing.74 With the President’s leader-
ship, Congress settled, instead, on broad-based, graduated income taxes as 
the centerpiece of wartime finance. The Revenue Act of 1942, in fact, 
marked the start of a new era of fiscal policy, as the dramatic increase in 
rates, the decrease in exemption levels, and the reintroduction of tax with-
holding, transformed the early class-based income tax into a mass-based 
income-tax system.75 As legal scholar Carolyn Jones has shown, the Treas-
ury Department facilitated this historic transformation by using nearly every 
form of popular media—from radio to newspapers to films—to cultivate a 
taxpaying culture.76 
What was perhaps most significant about the 1942 tax law was how it 
sought to balance the war costs between both middle-class and well-off 
Americans. The law dramatically cut exemption levels and thus widened the 
                                                                                                                      
 73. John Morton Blum, V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During 
World War Two 17 (1976). 
 74. Joseph J. Thorndike, “The Unfair Advantage of the Few”: The New Deal Origins of 
“Soak-the-Rich” Taxation, in The New Fiscal Sociology, supra note 20, at 29. 
 75. Brownlee, supra note 18, at 93–94. For more on the wartime political debates over 
federal taxation and the postwar consequences of FDR’s opposition to sales taxes, see Lawrence 
Zelenak, The Federal Retail Sales Tax That Wasn’t: An Actual History and an Alternative History, in 
73 Law & Contemporary Problems (forthcoming 2010) (copy of manuscript on file with the 
author). 
 76. Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of 
the Income Tax During World War II, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 685, 688 (1989). 
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circle of taxpayers, but as Bank, Stark, and Thorndike recount, the changes 
were even more profound at the peak of the income scale, where the top 
graduated rate climbed to 94 percent, surpassing even the top level of WWI 
(p. 97). “Clearly, rich Americans were being asked to pay handsomely,” the 
authors write, “even as middle-class Americans were struggling to complete 
their first round of income tax returns” (p. 98). 
FDR relished the “soak-the-rich” aspects of the new tax law. During the 
height of the Great Depression, he had singled out the country’s wealthiest 
citizens as “economic royalists,” blaming them for the continued economic 
troubles.77 The war emergency provided Roosevelt with an opportunity to 
strike back at these critics in the process of funding the war. FDR himself 
later aptly, and perhaps self-servingly, described the 1942 law as “the great-
est tax bill in American history” (p. 96). 
It didn’t take long, however, for political interests to intrude on the war-
time-tax legislative process. Political dynamics, as historian Mark Leff has 
illustrated, quickly allowed certain groups to “domesticate and delimit the 
meaning of sacrifice—to define it in terms that reinforced the validity of 
their own political interests and claims.”78 No sooner had the ink on the 1942 
Revenue Act dried, than Congress returned the following session with an-
other tax bill—one that provided only a fraction of the revenue that FDR 
had requested, but was loaded with tax benefits targeted at special interests. 
As part of his stinging veto of the 1943 Revenue Act, Roosevelt condemned 
the proposed legislation “as not a tax bill but a tax relief bill, providing re-
lief not for the needy but for the greedy” (p. 106). Congress overrode the 
president’s veto, marking the first time in American history that a revenue 
law was enacted without presidential approval. 
As War and Taxes notes, the enactment of the 1943 tax law signified a 
victory for self-indulgence over shared sacrifice. Yet, taken as a whole, the 
WWII tax regime is perhaps the “most compelling example of wartime fis-
cal sacrifice” (p. xiv). For it was during those pivotal years that the United 
States not only established the modern mass-based income tax, but also re-
lied more on taxation to extract fiscal sacrifice and fund the war than in any 
previous American conflict.79 Part of the reason for this success was FDR’s 
leadership in opposing seemingly regressive sales taxes and his insistence 
on balancing a mass income tax with steeply graduated rates for the wealthy. 
This lesson would not be lost on future lawmakers, even as American mili-
tary entanglements became more uncertain in the second half of the 
twentieth century.  
                                                                                                                      
 77. Eric Rauchway, The Great Depression & the New Deal: A Very Short Intro-
duction 106 (2008). 
 78. Leff, supra note 17, at 1298. 
 79. Hugh Rockoff has estimated that taxation accounted for nearly half of American wartime 
spending, with public borrowing and money creation accounting evenly for the remainder. Hugh 
Rockoff, The United States: From Plowshares to Swords 108 in The Economics of World War II: 
Six Great Powers in International Comparison 81, 108 (Mark Harrison ed., 1998).  
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III. The Cold War and the Importance of Timing 
Unlike the two total global wars, the conflicts emerging from the Cold 
War precipitated a different kind of political dynamic for fiscal policymak-
ing. Whereas earlier conflicts were generally wars officially waged by 
Congress, many of the battles of the Cold War were more ambiguous, ex-
ecutive-ordered police actions. As a result, straightforward appeals to 
patriotism were often not enough; the timing of wartime tax hikes thus be-
came pivotal. In this sense, catalytic events during the Cold War could 
prompt a crisis or emergency mentality, but that sentiment did not always 
persist throughout a given conflict or time period.80 By contrasting Cold War 
fiscal policies, the authors make a convincing case for the importance of 
bold, initial actions, or “strik[ing] while the iron is hot” (p. 141). Indeed, 
some of War and Taxes’ most instructive historical lessons come from com-
paring American tax policymaking during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. 
The Korean conflict, in particular, was built on the legacy created by the 
monumental transformations of World War II. Between the end of World 
War II in 1945 and the start of the Korean conflict in 1950, the American tax 
system went through a modest period of retrenchment. Yet, like nearly all 
past conflicts, WWII had a significant “ratchet effect” on government 
spending and tax revenues.81 Thus, though top individual rates declined from 
a wartime high of 94 percent in 1945 to 82 percent by 1948, they did not 
return to their prewar levels, nor did the tax base resort to an exclusive focus 
on the wealthiest citizens.82 With real wages rising, most Americans seemed 
to be content with the new tax system, and politicians had little reason to 
foment antitax sentiments.83 
The new postwar plateau of high taxes and the vivid and indelible 
memories of WWII obligations facilitated the calls for a return to patriotic 
self-sacrifice and fiscal discipline during the Korean conflict. Waged during 
the height of McCarthyism and in the wake of the Chinese Communist Rev-
olution, the Korean conflict came at a time when bipartisan support for 
containing communism led both political parties and most Americans to 
support a military presence in East Asia. The early support for containing 
communism translated into a greater willingness to share in wartime sacri-
fices.84 
                                                                                                                      
 80. See Dudziak, supra note 19, at 3, 7.  
 81. Sparrow, supra note 17, at  24–25. For more on the “ratchet effect” with regard to wars 
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Bulletin tabl.23, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/histab23.xls; see also W. Elliot Brownlee, 
Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich 60–61 (Joel Slemrod ed., 2000). 
 83. Andrea Louise Campbell, What Americans Think of Taxes, in The New Fiscal Sociol-
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 84. William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strate-
gic History (2002). 
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Political leaders led the way in reminding Americans about the inextri-
cable link between foreign policy and domestic tax law. Soon after 
American troops reached Korea in 1950, the statesman John Foster Dulles, 
who at the time was serving as a special advisor to the State Department, 
declared that “the time for sacrifice and discipline is here” (p. 113). Empha-
sizing the need to spread the costs of war, Dulles warned that “[m]any now 
will risk their lives before the hard battle of Korea is won” (p. 113). As a 
result, he continued, “We shall all have to give up some material enjoyments 
and be more frugal in our living. There will be fewer automobiles, television 
sets, and gadgets to buy and there will be bigger tax bills to pay” (p. 113). 
Dulles’s words proved to be prescient. Congress responded to the start of 
the Korean conflict by reversing the post-WWII reduction in taxes. Taking 
advantage of the combination of general prosperity, the political pressures of 
McCarthyism, and bipartisan congressional support for the military interven-
tion in Korea, the Truman Administration swiftly transformed a preconflict 
tax-relief bill into a major wartime tax increase, the largest in nearly a decade 
(pp. 112–16). With top marginal rates soaring to 45 percent for corporations 
and over 90 percent for individuals, the 1950 Revenue Act was quickly en-
acted—within forty-five days of being introduced—with overwhelming 
bipartisan support (p. 115). Lawmakers followed this substantive show of 
shared sacrifice with an excess-profits tax, modeled on similar levies used 
during the two world wars. 
The concern for equitably spreading the price of conflict dominated 
congressional discussions. As one lawmaker aptly put it in 1951, “I think the 
boys in Korea would appreciate it more if we in this country were to pay our 
own way instead of leaving it for them to pay when they get back” (p. 125). 
Committed to not passing the buck to the next generation or even to return-
ing GIs, American leaders forged a tax policy that Bank, Stark, and 
Thorndike persuasively depict as becoming “the closest the country has ever 
come to a pure ‘pay as you go’ approach to war financing” (p. 110). 
War and Taxes concedes that fiscal policy during the Korean conflict 
benefited from some unique historical circumstances. The fear over the 
growing spread of communism, which became increasingly frantic with the 
demagoguery of McCarthyism, fueled a unique “rally ‘round the flag’ at-
mosphere” (p. 115). Yet, during the early 1950s, economic and material 
prosperity may have trumped politics and foreign policy. American leaders 
were able to place the costs of the Korean intervention on to a wide swath of 
the current generation not only because they had near unanimous political 
support, but also because of flush economic times. The Korean conflict 
commenced during the uptick of post-WWII economic growth, during the 
early years of the so-called “golden age of American capitalism.”85 With 
annual real GDP growth averaging more than 3 percent from 1946–74, 
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lawmakers believed that they did not have to choose between guns and but-
ter.86 The start of what tax scholars have dubbed the “Era of Easy Finance” 
allowed American politicians to finance the war and other domestic spend-
ing with a minimum of home-front sacrifice.87 
Economic prosperity may have made it easier for American leaders to 
demand greater wartime sacrifice, but the timing of the tax increases, as the 
authors show, proved to be a crucial trigger. “[A]cting quickly and deci-
sively to raise capital and labor income taxes” was essential for Truman’s 
success (p. 141). Other wars were equally popular during their earlier 
phases, but few politicians demonstrated the steadfast fiscal leadership dis-
played by Truman and his congressional allies. 
Whereas President Truman was quick to exploit bipartisan support for 
the Korean conflict to pass tax hikes, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson bela-
bored and dodged the moments of financial reckoning. Of course, Vietnam 
began as a much more gradual and ambiguous conflict. In fact, during Ken-
nedy’s tenure, Vietnam remained in the background as policymakers 
focused on tax cuts as a way to stimulate economic growth and create jobs.88 
This conventional Keynesian thinking continued into the Johnson Admini-
stration, leading to the 1964 tax cut, which was enacted as part of a 
compromise with fiscal conservatives like Wilbur Mills, the powerful chair 
of the House Ways & Means Committee, who insisted on spending cuts.89 
By the mid-1960s, with the war in Vietnam and the recently initiated 
war on poverty both in full swing, President Johnson claimed that the nation 
could continue its spending spree without increasing taxes. “[T]his nation is 
mighty enough, its society is healthy enough, its people are strong enough, 
to pursue our goals in the rest of the world while still building a Great Soci-
ety here at home,” he announced during his 1966 State of the Union Address 
(p. 130). “Time may require further sacrifices. And if it does, then we will 
make them. But we will not heed those who wring it from the hopes of the 
unfortunate here in a land of plenty” (p. 130). For LBJ, choosing between 
guns and butter was a false choice.  
Reality, however, soon caught up with Johnson—within a year, time did 
require further sacrifices. In 1967, Johnson requested an income-tax “sur-
charge” of 6 percent linked to the increased spending for Vietnam.90 Because 
of the social turmoil of the late 1960s, the tax increase, which escalated to 
10 percent, was not enacted until eighteen months after Johnson first re-
quested it, and only after he announced that he would not seek re-election. 
By then it was apparent that LBJ’s misplaced optimism of being able simul-
taneously to provide guns and butter had taken a toll on the budget, as well 
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as the president. Near the end of his life, Johnson bitterly recalled how 
“[t]hat bitch of a war” had “killed the lady I really loved—the Great Soci-
ety.”91 
Johnson’s critical error, the authors of War and Taxes argue, was his 
failure to channel the American public’s initial support for the Vietnam War 
into shared sacrifice, as Truman had done in Korea. “In the final analysis,” 
they write, “Johnson simply placed a greater value on his domestic spending 
priorities than he did on the war in Vietnam. Not surprisingly, therefore, he 
exhibited extreme reluctance to ask for the wartime sacrifices so common in 
previous conflicts” (pp. 142–43). From this acute observation, the authors 
conclude that Johnson’s “decisions established a historical precedent for 
relegating war taxes to the back burner,” and thus “by the end of the war in 
Vietnam,” the traditional American value of shared wartime sacrifice “had 
plainly suffered a setback” (p. 143). 
War and Taxes’ depiction of Johnson’s fiscal mishandling of Vietnam is 
perhaps the strongest evidence in support of the book’s thesis and its at-
tempts to question the recent criticism of the Bush Administration. But if 
Johnson’s initial reluctance was a mistake, it was a mistake repeated by 
George W. Bush, who told Americans after 9/11 to go shopping instead of 
asking them to buy bonds or pay higher taxes. And it was a mistake repeated 
by Republican lawmakers like Tom DeLay who boldly claimed that tax cuts 
were essential to wartime patriotism.92 
In the end, though, the comparison between Vietnam and the war on ter-
ror is only half right. Unlike our recent leaders, Johnson ultimately signed 
off, albeit grudgingly, on a major tax hike and domestic spending cuts short-
ly after he announced his decision not to seek reelection. By contrast, the 
Bush Administration initiated a war on terror but continued to resist ac-
counting for the escalating military costs. To make fiscal matters even 
worse, the Republican Party enacted a series of tax cuts, aimed primarily at 
the wealthy, that exacerbated the growing federal deficit. In this sense, Pres-
ident Bush may, in fact, be the one setting a historical precedent for not only 
relegating war taxes to the back burner, but for having eliminated them 
completely from the kitchen of wartime fiscal policymaking.  
IV. The War on Terror and the Relentless Allegiance to Tax Cuts 
With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent geopolitical domi-
nance of the United States, American military excursions have become even 
more complex and ambiguous. But, as Bank, Stark, and Thorndike remind 
us, the post-9/11 war on terror remains too close to our own consciousness 
for any deep and detached historical perspective. Instead, in the book’s final 
substantive chapter, the authors briefly chronicle the background, develop-
ment, and legacy of the Bush wartime tax cuts. 
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The authors begin by tracing the origins of the Republican Party’s ideo-
logical commitment to tax cuts back to the 1994 Contract with America—a 
time of relative peace and prosperity. It was then that Newt Gingrich and 
other congressional leaders used the run up to the 1994 midterm election to 
campaign, as the authors recount, for “various tax cuts designed to ‘create 
jobs,’ ‘enhance wages,’ and ‘restore the American dream’ ” (p. 146). Em-
ploying the supply-side economics that had become popular during the 
1980s, conservative Republicans argued that tax cuts and limited govern-
ment were the secrets to economic growth (p. 155). 
After taking control of Congress, GOP politicians attempted to follow 
through on their promises by enacting dramatic tax relief legislation. Presi-
dent Clinton rejected the Republican demands for across-the-board tax cuts, 
but enacted some targeted middle-class tax relief measures. Robust eco-
nomic growth, relatively high tax rates, and the benefits of a post-Cold War 
“peace dividend” eventually led to a growing budget surplus in the last years 
of the twentieth century.93 All of this occurred, of course, absent the impera-
tives of war. 
Although the Republican demands for tax cuts were kept at bay during 
the Clinton years, a growing surplus soon provided GOP lawmakers with an 
easy target. Thus, during the 2000 presidential election, the calls for return-
ing tax dollars to those who earned them became an early and integral part 
of the Republican Party’s tax-cutting agenda. George W. Bush exploited this 
sentiment not only on the campaign trail, but in office: among the first piec-
es of legislation he signed as president was the Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,94 a tax cut that was estimated to cost 
$1.35 trillion over a ten-year period (p. 149). The era of Bush tax cuts had 
begun. 
The first Bush tax cut could be attributed to reasonable beliefs about the 
proper use of fiscal policy and limited government. Yet, after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, when the nation seemed primed to accept the 
sacrifices of war, most observers anticipated an end to the Republican tax-
cutting zeal. Indeed, if the past was any guide, the patriotic and nationalistic 
fervor that followed 9/11 should have occasioned a reversal in Republican 
thinking about tax policy. “Unlike Pearl Harbor, however, there was almost 
no talk in the wake of the September 11th attacks of a need to increase taxes 
to mobilize for war,” write the authors (p. 151). 
Instead, the Bush Administration responded by relying on American 
consumerism to lift the economy out of a recent recession that appeared to 
be getting worse after the 9/11 attacks. As Bank, Stark, and Thorndike show, 
there were good reasons why the anticipated military response to 9/11 
would be different from Pearl Harbor or other previous wars.  The contin-
ued—though shrinking—surplus and the unconventional aspects of a war on 
terror suggested “that U.S. lawmakers simply did not face the same sense of 
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fiscal urgency following the September 11th attacks as they did in previous 
conflicts” (p. 151). This optimism continued even after U.S. troops were 
deployed to Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom in Novem-
ber 2001. 
Yet, any faith that the Bush Administration was sincerely concerned 
about its wartime fiscal obligations was completely shattered in the spring 
of 2003. Within a span of a few months, the administration and its congres-
sional allies launched Operation Iraqi Freedom and enacted additional tax 
cuts95 that would cost $350 billion over ten years.96 It was during the debates 
over this tax bill that Tom DeLay uttered his now infamous comment about 
the importance of tax cuts in the face of war.97 Political leaders were able not 
only to fold their actions in Iraq dubiously into their rhetoric about a “war 
on terror,” they also convinced ordinary Americans of the righteousness of 
tax cuts.98 Throughout the remainder of its tenure, the Bush White House 
continued to maintain its focus simultaneously on tax cuts and military 
spending for the war on terror, despite the tenuous link between 9/11 and the 
invasion of Iraq. The traditional trade-off between guns and butter no longer 
seemed to apply. 
The Republican Party’s relentless allegiance to tax cuts, even after the 
deployment of troops in two distant lands, is exceedingly difficult to recon-
cile with the historical record—and is just one reason why many people 
continue to contest the coherence of a “war on terror.” Past leaders such as 
Presidents Lincoln and Johnson, as War and Taxes persuasively illustrates, 
did initially dodge and disavow the need for fiscal discipline in the midst of 
war, but they eventually conceded their early errors and took responsibility 
for the mounting wartime costs. They ultimately agreed that fiscal citizen-
ship meant that the state had a reciprocal obligation to its constituents—an 
obligation to ensure that the total price of conflict was distributed fairly 
among all citizens. 
Conclusion 
War and Taxes makes an important contribution to the literature on the 
history of American tax policy. By uncovering the complex and contested 
circumstances surrounding past wartime fiscal policy, the book provides a 
badly needed corrective to an overly romantic view of U.S. history. The 
standard narratives of American wartime tax policy—and the recent social 
commentary that has relied on these conventional accounts—have presumed 
too frequently that patriotism has naturally and inexorably always triumphed 
                                                                                                                      
 95. Weisman, supra note 5. 
 96. Business Digest, N.Y. Times, May 24, 2003, at C1.  
 97. See The Budget Fight is Now, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 98. For more on how ordinary Americans were convinced about the need for tax cuts, see 
generally Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American 
Mind, 3 Persp. on Pol. 15 (2005); Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Abandoning the Middle: The 
Bush Tax Cuts and the Limits of Democratic Control, 3 Persp. on Pol. 33 (2005). 
MEHROTRA FTP 4M.DOC 3/4/2010 2:10 PM 
April 2010] Price of Conflict 1077 
 
over self-interest; that American citizens and their leaders have been ready 
and willing to embrace a tradition of wartime shared sacrifice. In some 
ways, this perspective is, indeed, an idealistic picture of the past. The au-
thors, therefore, are correct to caution against contrasting recent policy with 
a “cardboard cutout version of an imagined past” (p. xiii). 
Received wisdom is often overly simplified. But it is also sometimes ac-
curate. Although the history of wartime taxation has been complex and 
contested, there has undeniably been a strong tradition of exacting shared 
sacrifices during wartime.  Recent and current tax policy seems to deny the 
significance of this tradition.  The Bush Administration not only squandered 
opportunities to harness American patriotism for the sake of wartime sacri-
fice, it also abdicated any sense of fiscal accountability throughout its 
leadership. The Obama Administration, for its part, has been confronted by 
a historic financial crisis, a deep recession, and material changes to the war-
time conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan—all this has altered the priorities of 
wartime fiscal policymaking. 
Nonetheless, even President Obama has made only limited gestures to-
ward the American tradition of shared wartime sacrifice. The Democratic 
Party’s penchant for targeted “middle-class” tax cuts and the Obama Ad-
ministration’s pledge to soak only the rich with new tax hikes have replaced 
the Republican commitment to across-the-board tax reduction.99 Likewise, 
discussions of moving the focus of American military might from Iraq to 
Afghanistan have only solidified the seeming permanence of the war on ter-
ror.
100
 Consequently, foreign policy and domestic tax law are still often 
treated as mutually exclusive areas of policymaking. It appears as if the 
Bush years not only have been an historical anomaly, but that they have also 
operated as a critical juncture or transformative moment in American politi-
cal and economic development, creating a new mindset about wartime 
taxation and the politics of fiscal citizenship. 
Bank, Stark, and Thorndike recognize that the Bush-era tax cuts “plainly 
constitute an extraordinary episode in the history of American war finance” 
(p. 164). Veering from their initial thesis, the authors to their credit ac-
knowledge the “inescapable fact” that “the idea of consciously and 
aggressively reducing federal tax revenues while simultaneously pursuing a 
war abroad is new to the American experience” (pp. 164–65). Faced with 
this challenge, the authors are forced to explain the apparent gestalt shift in 
wartime tax policy. The concluding chapter of War and Taxes thus serves as 
something of a deus ex machina, summoned to help resolve the difficulty  
of reconciling the Bush Administration’s actions with the historical record. 
The authors suggest that the recent inversion in the politics of wartime taxa-
tion and fiscal citizenship may be explained by broader, structural  
                                                                                                                      
 99. Jackie Calmes, Obama’s Pledge to Tax Only the Rich Can’t Pay for Everything, Analysts 
Say, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 2009, at A10. 
 100. Andrew Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism 
187–89 (2009); Elisabeth Bumiller, With Boots in Iraq, Minds Drift to Afghanistan, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 1, 2009, at A1; Yochi J. Dreazen and Naftali Bendavid, Gates Gives Obama Afghan Troop 
Request, Wall. St. J. Oct. 8, 2009. 
MEHROTRA FTP 4M.DOC 3/4/2010 2:10 PM 
1078 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 108:1053 
 
transformations in economic, political, and social conditions; namely, the 
growing insignificance of inflation, the marginalization of deficit concerns, 
and the end of the draft (pp. 168–74). 
Despite these incongruous yet highly plausible explanations, it is diffi-
cult to come away from War and Taxes’ balanced, thorough, and ostensibly 
nonpartisan account without thinking that the Bush Administration has 
thrust us into a new era of wartime tax policymaking. Earlier administra-
tions and Congresses may have had momentary lapses of resolve, but today 
we seem to have entered a new age of sustained fiscal irresponsibility—a 
new age when too many political leaders cling to the dubious claim that 
“nothing is more important in the face of war than cutting taxes” (p. 155). 
